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1 Introduction
When a firm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided among its creditors? How
should an extra time be divided among the activities involved in a project without delaying it? Both
problems have been studied in the literature.
The first one is answered in the field of bankruptcy problems. A bankruptcy problem is a pure
distribution problem in which the amount to divide is insufficient to cover the agents claims. They
have been introduced and studied by O´Neill (1982), and Aumann and Maschler (1985) among others.
Thomson (2003) and Moulin (2002) offer two complete surveys on this topic.
The second question arises from PERT problems, introduced by Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002b).
These problems are inspired by the Project Evaluation Review Technique, an operational research tool
described in detail in Moder and Philips (1970). This tool is designed to schedule and coordinate the
activities involved in a project. Some of these activities must be performed sequentially, others can
be performed in parallel with other activities, and this collection of serial and parallel tasks can be
modeled as a network. Once the schedule is designed and the PERT time (the time required to finish
the project) is computed, the coordinator identifies the activities that can be allowed more time, if
required, without delaying the project and estimates the slack associated with each of them. At this
point, the PERT problem focuses on how to allocate the extra time among these activities, without
delaying the project, in a “well-behaved” manner. This problem has been also studied in Castro et al
(2007).
Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002a) introduce a general class of problems that contains as subsets
bankruptcy and PERT problems, and call them problems with constraints and claims (PCC). They
study how the proportionality principle works on this new class of problems by proposing two different
rules based on it: the proportional rule (weak Pareto optimal) and the extended proportional rule
(Pareto optimal). They also characterize the extended rule. Later, Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2007)
center their work on defining allocation rules to solve any problem with constraints and claims following
the equal award principle.
In this paper, I focus my study on equality but according to losses, regarding that no agent receives
a negative amount. Two single-valued rules are defined: the constrained equal loss rule, a weakly
Pareto optimal rule, and the extended constrained equal loss rule, a Pareto optimal rule. The object
of this paper is to characterize the extended rule.
There are several characterizations of the constrained equal loss rule in the bankruptcy literature:
Herrero and Villar (2001) characterize it by means of consistency, exclusion and composition up.
Later, Herrero and Villar (2002) characterize the constrained equal loss rule in terms of independence
of residual claims and composition up. Herrero (2003) proves that the constrained equal loss rule is
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the only efficient rule satisfying symmetry, consistency, minimal rights first and composition down.
The aim of this paper is to extend these characterizations to problems with constraints and claims.
For it, I adapt the definitions of the properties above to the new model. Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez
(2002a) show that the relations among properties in PCC are completely different from the relations
of their counterparts in bankruptcy problems. For instance, even though, in bankruptcy problems
Pareto optimality is compatible with composition down, in the new model Pareto optimality becomes
incompatible with this property. Thus, I define a weaker property called limited composition down,
which is compatible with Pareto optimality.
I find out that the two characterizations by Herrero and Villar cannot be extended since the
extended constrained equal loss rule fails to satisfy both exclusion and independence of residual claims.
Finally, I extend the characterization by Herrero (2003) by means of Pareto optimality, symmetry,
consistency, minimal rights first, limited composition down and I need to add a new property specially
defined for PCC, lower bound requirement over subsets. Thus, no characterization of the constrained
equal loss rule can be extended to this new model just by using the same properties as in bankruptcy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and motivates problems with constraints and
claims. Section 3 defines different appealing properties of the allocation rules and finally Section 4 is
devoted to the rules following the equal loss principle, centering the study on the extended constrained
equal loss rule and its characterization. Most of the proofs are in Section 5 (Appendix).
2 Problems with constraints and claims
First I introduce some notation.
Given a finite set N , n denotes the cardinality of N . Given S ⊂ N and x = (xi)i∈N , y = (yi)i∈N ∈
RN , we define: xS = (xi)i∈S ∈ RS , in particular, x−i = xN\{i}; x + y = (xi + yi)i∈N ; x ≥ y when
xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N ; and x > y when xi > yi for all i ∈ N .
Let P = {pi1, . . . , pip} be a collection of subsets of N , not necessarily disjoint, that covers N( p⋃
i=1
pii = N
)
. Given M ⊂ N with M 6= ∅, PM denotes the collection of subsets induced by P in M ,
i.e., PM = {pi ∩M : pi ∈ P, pi ∩M 6= ∅}.
Given Y ⊂ RN the Pareto Boundary of Y is given by PB(Y ) = {y ∈ Y : if x ∈ RN , x ≥
y and x 6= y then x /∈ Y } and the Weak Pareto Boundary is given by WPB(Y ) = {y ∈ Y : if x ∈
RN , x > y then x /∈ Y }.
In a problem with constraints and claims (briefly PCC), there are several agents claiming on a
homogeneous and infinitely indivisible resource. But, it is assumed that there are several subsets of
agents, not necessarily disjoint, given by P , and each subset cannot be awarded more than a part of
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the resource available.
Definition 1 A PCC is a 4-tuple (N,P, c, E) where N =
⋃
pi∈P
pi is the set of agents, P is a collection
of subsets that covers N , 0 ≤ c ∈ RN is the vector whose coordinates are the claims of the agents and
E = (Epi)pi∈P ∈ R|P |, where Epi represents an upper bound of a part of the resource available for the
subset pi. I will often write (c, E) instead of (N,P, c, E). Let G(N) denote the class of PCC with set
of agents N , and G the class of all PCC.
Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), the set of feasible allocations of (c, E) is given by:
F (c, E) =
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 ≤ xi ≤ ci, for every i ∈ N∑
i∈pi
xi ≤ Epi, for every pi ∈ P

Definition 2 Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), a rule is a map R that associates with each problem (c, E) ∈ G(N)
an allocation R(c, E) ∈ RN , where each Ri(c, E) represents the award received by agent i.
O’Neill (1982) defines a bankruptcy problem as a 3-tuple (N, c,E) where N is the set of claimants,
c denotes the vector of claims, E is the resource available, and E ≤
∑
i∈N
ci.
Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002b) define a PERT problem as a 3-tuple (G, (asi)i∈N , (pspi)pi∈P ),
where G is the directed graph that models the project, N holds the set of activities involved in it,
P denotes the set of paths from the beginning till the end of the project, and pspi (asi) is the slack
associated with path pi (activity i).
Both problems can be seen as particular cases of a problem with constraints and claims as the
following table shows:
Bankruptcy problems PERT problems
(N, c,E) (G, (asi)i∈N , (pspi)pi∈P )
N = {activities}
PCC P = {N} P = {paths}
(N,P, c, E) c = (asi)i∈N
E = (pspi)pi∈N
Note that any bankruptcy problem can be expressed as a PCC where P = {N}. However, not
every PCC with P = {N} is a bankruptcy problem since E ≤
∑
i∈N
ci must also hold. Bergantin˜os and
Lorenzo (2007) describe an example of a PCC which is neither a bankruptcy problem nor a PERT
problem.
4
3 Properties of the rules
In this section, I present some desirable properties of the rules. Most of them are adaptations of
well-known properties of the bankruptcy literature. However, there is one property specifically defined
for PCC. Consider an allocation rule R.
Two properties about optimality are defined: Pareto optimality (PO): R(c, E) ∈ PB(F (c, E)) for
all (c, E) ∈ G(N) and weak Pareto optimality (WPO): R(c, E) ∈WPB(F (c, E)) for all (c, E) ∈ G(N).
Agents with equal claims, who are subjected to the same constraints, should receive equal awards.
This property is called equal treatment of equals (ETE): for all (c, E) ∈ G(N), given i, j ∈ N such that
ci = cj and i ∈ pi ⇔ j ∈ pi, then Ri(c, E) = Rj(c, E).
A PCC (c, E) can be interpreted as solving many subproblems as subsets in P . And it would
be desirable for an agent not to receive less than the minimum of the amounts he is awarded in the
subproblems in which he is involved. This is stated by the next property. Lower bound requirement
over subsets (LS) (Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez, 2002a): for all (c, E) ∈ G(N) and every i ∈ N , it is
verified that: Ri(c, E) ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
Ri(cpi, Epi).
LS is an empty property in bankruptcy problems because it states thatR(c, E) ≥ R(c, E). However,
there are rules which do not satisfy LS in PCC.
The minimal right of an agent i is the minimum of the difference between the amount available,
in every state in which agent i participates, and the sum of the claims of the other claimants joining
that state when this difference is non-negative, and 0 otherwise.
mi(c, E) = max
{
0, min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi\{i}
cj
}}
.
It is interesting to require that the awards vector should be equivalently obtainable directly or
by first assigning to each agent his minimal right, adjusting claims and states down by m(c, E), and
finally, applying the rule to divide the remainder. This property is introduced in Curiel et al. (1987)
and it is used in Dagan (1996). A rule satisfies minimal rights first (MRF) when for all (c, E) ∈ G(N)
it is verified that R(c, E) = m(c, E) + R(c′, E′), where c′ = c −m(c, E) and E′pi = Epi −
∑
i∈pi
mi(c, E)
for all pi ∈ P .
Composition down (CD), also known as path independence, states that if the estate value is reeval-
uated and found to be worth less than initially thought, if we cancel the initial division and apply the
rule to the revised problem or if we consider the initial awards as claims on the revised value and apply
the rule to the problem so defined, the awards vectors obtained in both ways of proceeding should
coincide. This property is introduced in Moulin (2000). Given (c, E) ∈ G(N) and E′ ∈ R|P | such that
0 ≤ E′ < E, then R(c, E′) = R(R(c, E), E′).
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I will denote by limited composition down (LCD) the property composition down restricted to
problems with P = {N} (bankruptcy problems).
Consistency says that if some agents leave with their awards, and the PCC is reevaluated from
the point of view of the remaining agents, the rule should allocate to these agents the same awards as
those obtained in the initial problem. Consistency (CONS): for all (N,P, c, E) ∈ G(N), givenM ⊂ N ,
M 6= ∅ and (M,PM , cM , E∗M ) ∈ G(M) where E
∗
pi∩M = Epi −
∑
i∈pi∩(N\M)
Ri(c, E) for all pi ∩M ∈ PM ,
then Ri(M,PM , cM , E
∗
M ) = Ri(N,P, c, E) for all i ∈M .
Remark 1 Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002a) show that the relation among these properties changes
completely when adapted to PCC. In particular, they prove that Pareto optimality becomes incompatible
with composition up. Following a similar argument it can be easily proved that Pareto optimality is also
incompatible with composition down. That is the reason why the property limited composition down is
defined.
4 Rules according to the equal loss principle
In this section, two single-valued rules based on the equal loss principle are introduced. This principle
states that all agents suffer the same loss, subject to the condition that no creditor ends up with a
negative award. The definition of the constrained equal loss rule is very similar to its definition in
bankruptcy problems.
Definition 3 The constrained equal loss rule (briefly CEL) divides equally the losses, provided no
agent receives a negative transfer, i.e.
CELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λ} = max{0, ci − λ},
where λ =
 min {λ′ : (ci −min{ci, λ′})i∈N ∈ F (c, E)} when c /∈ F (c, E)0 otherwise.
It is easy to prove that when c /∈ F (c, E), λ = max
pi∈P
{λpi}, where λpi is the minimum feasible loss in
subproblem (cpi, Epi).
This rule is defined in Sa´nchez (1999). She proves that CEL satisfies WPO and that there always
exists pi0 ∈ P such that
∑
i∈pi0
CELi(c, E) = Epi0 . CEL also satisfies ETE and CD. Nevertheless, it fails
to satisfy PO, CONS, and MRF as the following example shows:
Example 1 Consider the problem (N,P, c, E), where N = {1, 2, 3}, P = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, c = (2, 8, 4)
and E = (5, 10).
6
• CEL does not satisfy PO: CEL(c, E) = (0, 5, 1) /∈ PB(F (c, E)).
• CEL does not satisfy CONS: Consider M = {3}. Then, PM = {{3}}, cM = c3 = 4, EM =
10− 5 = 5, and CEL3(cM , E∗M ) = 4 6= 1 = CEL3(c, E).
• CEL does not satisfy MRF: The vector of minimal rights is given bym(c, E) = (0, 3, 2). Consider
c′ = c−m(c, E) = (2, 5, 2) and E′ = (2, 5). Then, m(c, E) +CEL(c′, E′) = (0, 3, 2) + (0, 2, 0) =
(0, 5, 2) 6= (0, 5, 1) = CEL(c, E).
I am interested in efficient allocations so, in order to obtain a rule satisfying PO, I will apply the
constrained equal loss principle repeatedly until no agent can increase his payoff. I will call the rule
so defined the extended constrained equal loss rule (ECEL). Now I define this process formally:
• Step 1. (N1, P 1, c1, E1) = (N,P, c, E). Compute CELi(c1, E1) = c1i −min{c
1
i , λ
1} for any i ∈ N ,
where λ1 = max
pi∈P
{λpi}.
Assume (Ns, P s, cs, Es) and CEL(cs, Es) have already been calculated for any s ≤ t.
• Step t+1. Let (N t+1, P t+1, ct+1, Et+1) be defined by:
– N t+1 =
i ∈ N t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∃ ε > 0 such that(CELi(ct, Et) + ε, CEL−i(ct, Et)) ∈ F (ct, Et)
.
– P t+1 =
{
pit ∩N t+1 : pit ∈ P t, pit ∩N t+1 6= ∅
}
= P t
Nt+1
.
– ct+1 = (cti − CELi(c
t, Et))i∈Nt+1 = (min {c
t
i, λ
t})i∈Nt+1 .
– Et+1
pit+1
= Etpit −
∑
i∈pit
CELi(c
t, Et) for any pit+1 = pit ∩N t+1 ∈ P t+1.
Compute CELi(c
t+1, Et+1) = ct+1i −min
{
ct+1i , λ
t+1
}
for any i ∈ N t+1.
Since CEL satisfies WPO, N t+1  N t and the process described above will end in a finite number
of steps, i.e. there exists a stage T where NT 6= ∅ but NT+1 = ∅. For every i ∈ N there also exists a
stage Ti such that i ∈ NTi but i /∈ NTi+1.
Definition 4 Given an agent i ∈ N , I define the extended constrained equal loss rule ECEL as
ECELi(c, E) =
Ti∑
t=1
CELi(c
t, Et).
Remark 2 Note that if during the process above there is a stage t with λt = 0, the process ends at
stage t, ct ∈ F (ct, Et), and every agent in N t is awarded all his claim.
The next example shows how to compute ECEL.
Example 2 Consider the PCC defined in Example 1.
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• Consider N1 = {1, 2, 3}, P 1 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, c1 = (2, 8, 4), and E1 = (5, 10). We compute
CEL1(c1, E1) = (0, 5, 1). Note that CEL11(c
1, E1) + CEL12(c
1, E1) = 5 = E{1,2} but, since
CEL12(c
1, E1) + CEL13(c
1, E1) = 6 < E{2,3} = 10 and CEL
1
3(c
1, E1) = 1 < c13 = 4, we move to
next step.
• Consider N2 = {3}, P 2 = {{3}}, c2 = 4 − 1 = 3, and E2{3} = 10 − 6 = 4. We compute
CEL2(c2, E2) = CEL23(c
2, E2) = 3 = c23. The process ends.
Then, ECEL(c, E) = (0, 5, 1) + (0, 0, 3) = (0, 5, 4).
Proposition 1 Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), it is verified that:
1. λt+1 < λt for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
2. ECELi(c, E) = ci −min
{
ci, λ
Ti
}
.
3. |P t+1| < |P t| for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
4. Given i ∈ N with ECELi(c, E) < ci, there exists pi ∈ P where i ∈ pi, pi∩NTi 6= ∅, pi∩NTi+1 = ∅,
and
∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) = Epi.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the next proposition we prove that ECEL satisfies all the properties mentioned in the paper
but CD.
Proposition 2 The extended constrained equal loss rule satisfies WPO, PO, LCD, ETE, LS, CONS
and MRF.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the next theorem we provide a characterization of ECEL in the class of all PCC.
Theorem 1 The extended constrained equal loss rule is the only rule satisfying PO, LS, ETE, MRF,
CONS and LCD.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 3 Not every characterization of the constrained equal loss in bankruptcy problems can be
extended to problems with constraints and claims by the aid of consistency and lower bound requirement
over subsets. Herrero and Villar (2001) characterize the constrained equal loss rule with CONS, CU
and Exclusion (EXC). This property states that if an agent’s claim is smaller than the loss per capita,
he should be awarded nothing. We can adapt this property to this new framework in the following way:
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we say that a rule R satisfies EXC if given an agent whose claim verifies that ci ≤
Lpi
|pi| for all pi ∈ P
with i ∈ pi, where Lpi = max
{
0,
∑
j∈pi
cj − Epi
}
, it is verified that Ri(c, E) = 0.
But ECEL does not satisfy EXC: consider the problem (c, E) ∈ G(N) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, P =
{{1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {4, 5}}, c = (1, 5, 5, 4, 9) and E = (11, 11, 5). The vector of losses is L = (4, 4, 8)
and for every pi ∈ P with 1 ∈ pi it is verified that c1 = 1 <
Lpi
|pi| =
4
3 . However, ECEL1(c, E) = 1.
Furthermore, Herrero and Villar (2002) characterize the constrained equal loss rule in terms of CU
and Independence of residual claims (IRC). This property states that if an agent’s claim is residual,
i.e. the aggregate claim that results from deducting ci from all agents whose claims are higher than ci
exceeds the worth of the available estate, this agent should be awarded nothing. In PCC this property
says that if Epi ≤
∑
j∈pi
max{0, cj− ci} for all pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi then Ri(c, E) = 0. However, ECEL
also fails to satisfy IRC. If we consider the example above, the claim of agent 1 is residual, although
ECEL1(c, E) > 0.
This shows that in the new model, the extended constrained equal loss rule becomes less detrimental
with agents with small claims than it is in bankruptcy problems.
To end this section, we proof that the properties that characterize the extended constrained equal
loss rule except LCD are independent. We do not know what happens with LCD.
• Let R be defined by R(c, E) = c for all (c, E) ∈ G(N). It clearly satisfies all properties but PO.
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), consider the extended constrained equal award rule (ECEA) defined in
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2007). They prove that ECEA satisfies PO, LS, CONS and ETE.
Moreover, in bankruptcy problems ECEA coincides with the constrained equal award rule,
which satisfies CD. Thus, ECEA satisfies LCD. However, it does not satisfy MRF. Consider
(c, E) ∈ G(N) with N = {1, 2, 3}, P = {N}, c = (6, 6, 3), and E = 12. We have that m(c, E) +
ECEA(c′, E′) = (3, 3, 0) + (2, 2, 2) = (5, 5, 2). Although ECEA(c, E) = (4.5, 4.5, 3).
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), let us define a priority rule R(c, E) where agents get their award according
to the order 1, 2, . . . , n. Let (c, E) ∈ G(N).
We define R1(c, E) = min
1∈pi∈P
{c1, Epi}.
Assume that we have defined Rj(c, E) for all j ∈ N , j < i. We define
Ri(c, E) = min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Rj(c, E)
}
.
Of course R satisfies PO. When P = {N}, R is a priority rule. Moulin (2000) proves that this
kind of rule satisfies CD. Thus, R satisfies LCD.
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Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2007) prove that R satisfies LS and CONS.
R satisfies MRF. By definition of R is easy to prove that Ri(c, E) ≥ mi(c, E) for all i ∈ N .
Moreover
∑
j∈pi
Rj(c, E) ≤ Epi for all pi ∈ P . Thus, given i ∈ N we have that
Ri(c, E) ≤ min
i∈pi
{
Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j 6=i
Rj(c, E)
}
≤ min
i∈pi
{
Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Rj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi:j>i
mj(c, E)
}
.
Thus, it is easy to prove that given i ∈ N
Ri(c, E) = min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Rj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi:j>i
mj(c, E)
}
.
Consider agent 1,
R1(c, E) = min
1∈pi∈P
{
c1, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j>1
mj(c, E)
}
= min
1∈pi∈P
{
c′1 +m1(c, E), E
′
pi +
∑
j∈pi
mj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi:j>1
mj(c, E)
}
= min
1∈pi∈P
{
c′1 +m1(c, E), E
′
pi +m1(c, E)
}
= min
1∈pi∈P
{
c′1, E
′
pi
}
+m1(c, E) = R1(c
′, E′) +m1(c, E).
Assume Rk(c, E) = mk(c, E) +Rk(c
′, E′) for all k < i. Consider agent i ∈ N .
Ri(c, E) = min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Rj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi:j>i
mj(c, E)
}
= min
i∈pi∈P
{
c′i +mi(c, E), E
′
pi +
∑
j∈pi
mj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Rj(c
′, E′)
−
∑
j∈pi:j<i
mj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi:j>i
mj(c, E)
}
= min
i∈pi∈P
{
c′i +mi(c, E), E
′
pi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Rj(c
′, E′) +mi(c, E)
}
= min
i∈pi∈P
{
c′i, E
′
pi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Rj(c
′, E′)
}
+mi(c, E) = Ri(c
′, E′) +mi(c, E).
R does not satisfy ETE. Consider the following example: N = {1, 2}, P = {N}, c = (2, 2) and
E = 3. Agents 1 and 2 are symmetric, although, R(c, E) = (2, 1).
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), consider the following relation between agents:
i ∼ j ⇔ for every pi ∈ P , i ∈ pi ⇔ j ∈ pi. We denote by [k] the equivalence class of agent k ∈ N .
We can associate with every equivalence class [k] a vector xk = (xkpi)pi∈P ∈ R
|P | such that:
xkpi =
 0 if [k] ∩ pi = ∅1 if [k] ⊂ pi
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We define the rule in two stages:
– Stage 1: We divide E among the equivalence classes following the priority rule given by the
lexicographic order. If xi and xk are the vectors associated with the equivalence classes [i]
and [k], we say that [i] has the priority over [k] if and only if xi ≤L xk, where ≤L denotes
the lexicographic order. We denote by RL[k](c, E) the award received by the equivalence class
[k] in this stage.
– Stage 2: We divide RL[k](c, E) among the members of [k] following the equal loss principle.
Then, for any i ∈ [k]: Ri(c, E) = CELi
(
c[k], R
L
[k](c, E)
)
.
R satisfies PO. Since symmetric agents belong to the same equivalence class and CEL satisfies
ETE in bankruptcy problems, R satisfies ETE. R coincides with CEL in bankruptcy problems.
Since CEL satisfies CD in bankruptcy problems, R satisfies LCD.
R satisfies CONS. Given M ⊂ N , with M 6= ∅ consider the problem (M,PM , cM , E∗M ). We must
prove that Ri(cM , E
∗
M ) = Ri(c, E) for all i ∈M .
Consider the problem (M˜, P˜M , c˜M , E˜
∗
M ) associated with (M,PM , cM , E
∗
M ):
– M˜ = {[k] ∩M : [k] ∈ N˜ , [k] ∩M 6= ∅}.
– P˜M = {piM : pi ∩M ∈ PM}, where piM = {[k] ∩M ∈ M˜ : [k] ⊂ pi}.
– c˜kM =
∑
j∈[k]∩M
cj .
– E˜∗p˜iM = E
∗
pi∩M .
Assume, without loss of generality, that x1 <L x2 <L . . . <L xk. It is easy to see that the
lexicographic order is preserved among the equivalence classes in M˜ , i.e., given [i]∩M, [j]∩M ∈
M˜ , if [i] <L [j] then [i] ∩M <L [j] ∩M .
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2007) prove that R[k]∩M (c˜M , E˜
∗
M ) =
∑
i∈[k]∩M
Ri(c, E) for all [k]∩M ∈
M˜ .
We now prove that Ri(cM , E
∗
M ) = Ri(c, E) for all i ∈M . Consider i ∈ [k] ∩M .
Ri(cM , E
∗
M ) = CELi(c[k]∩M , R
L
[k]∩M (c˜M , E˜
∗
M )) = CELi
(
c[k]∩M ,
∑
l∈[k]∩M
Rl(c, E)
)
= CELi
(
c[k]∩M , R
L
[k](c, E)−
∑
l∈[k]∩(N\M)
Rl(c, E)
)
= CELi
(
c[k]∩M , R
L
[k](c, E)−
∑
l∈[k]∩(N\M)
CELl(c[k], R
L
[k](c, E))
)
.
Since CEL satisfies CONS, the last expression coincides with CELi(c[k], R
L
[k](c, E)) = Ri(c, E).
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R satisfies MRF. Following similar arguments as the ones used when we prove that the priority
rule satisfiesMRF, we can easily prove thatRL[k](c, E) =
∑
j∈[k]
mj(c, E)+R
L
[k](c
′, E′) for all [k] ∈ N˜ .
Next we prove that mi(c[k], R
L
[k](c, E)) ≥ mi(c, E) for all i ∈ N . Assume i ∈ [k], we have that
mi(c[k], R
L
[k](c, E)) = max
{
0,min
{
ci, R
L
[k](c, E)−
∑
j∈[k]:j 6=i
cj
}}
= max
{
0,min
{
ci, min
[k]∈p˜i∈P˜
{ ∑
j∈[k]
cj , Ep˜i −
∑
[j]∈p˜i:[j] 6=[k]
RL[j](c, E)
}
−
∑
j∈[k]:j 6=i
cj
}}
= max
{
0, min
i∈piP
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi\[k]
Rj(c, E)−
∑
j∈[k]:j 6=i
cj
}}
≥ max
{
0, min
i∈piP
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi
cj
}}
= mi(c, E).
Since CEL satisfies MRF in bankruptcy problems, CELi(c[k], R
L
[k](c, E)) = ci −min{ci, λ[k]} ≥
mi(c[k], R
L
[k](c, E)) ≥ mi(c, E). Therefore, min{ci, λ[k]} ≤ ci − mi(c, E) = c
′
i and it is easy to
prove that min{ci, λ[k]} = min{c
′
i, λ[k]}.
Consider CELi(c
′
[k], R
L
[k](c
′, E′)) = c′i −min{c
′
i, λ
′
[k]}. We have that
RL[k](c, E) =
∑
j∈[k]
(cj −min{cj, λ[k]}) =
∑
j∈[k]
(c′j +mj(c, E)−min{c
′
j , λ[k]})
=
∑
j∈[k]
(c′j −min{c
′
j, λ[k]}) +
∑
j∈[k]
mj(c, E).
Thus,
∑
j∈[k]
(c′j −min{c
′
j , λ[k]}) = R
L
[k](c, E)−
∑
j∈[k]
mj(c, E) = R
L
[k](c
′, E′). Hence, λ[k] = λ
′
[k] and
Ri(c, E) = CELi(c[k], R
L
[k](c, E)) = ci −min{ci, λ[k]} = mi(c, E) + c
′
i −min{c
′
i, λ[k]}
= mi(c, E) + CELi
(
c′[k], R
L
[k](c, E)−
∑
j∈[k]
mj(c, E)
)
= mi(c, E) + CELi
(
(ci −mi(c, E))i∈[k], R
L
[k](c
′, E′)
)
= mi(c, E) +Ri(c
′, E′).
Nevertheless LS is not satisfied. Consider N = {1, 2, 3}, P = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, c = (4, 6, 4) and
E = (4, 4). The lexicographic order is [2][1][3] andR(c, E) = (0, 4, 0). However, min
1∈pi∈P
R1(cpi, Epi) =
CEL1(cpi1 , Epi1) = 1.
• CONS : Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), let us consider the following rule:
Ri(c, E) = min
i∈pi∈P
CELi(cpi, Epi) + ECEAi(c
′, E′)
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where c′i = ci− min
i∈pi∈P
CELi(cpi, Epi) for all i ∈ N and E′α = Eα−
∑
j∈α
min
j∈pi∈P
CELj(cpi , Epi) for all
α ∈ P .
It clearly satisfies PO, ETE, and LS by means of the definition. When P = {N}, R(c, E) =
CEL(c, E) and CEL satisfies CD in bankruptcy problems. Thus, R satisfies LCD.
It can be proved that min
i∈pi∈P
{CELi(cpi, Epi)} = mi(c, E) + min
i∈pi∈P
{CEL(c′′pi, E
′′
pi)} where c
′′ =
c−m(c, E) and E′′pi = Epi −
∑
j∈pi
mj(c, E). Therefore, R satisfies MRF.
Nevertheless R does not satisfy CONS. Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, P = {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4}, {4}},
c = (8, 10, 8, 6) and E = (20, 8, 2). If we compute the awards, we obtain R(c, E) =
(
19
3 ,
25
3 ,
16
3 , 2
)
.
Consider M = {1, 2, 3}, then RM (cM , E
∗
M ) = (6, 8, 6) 6= RM (c, E).
5 Appendix
In this section I prove the results stated in the paper.
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Given (c, E) ∈ G(N),
1. Suppose 0 < λt ≤ λt+1. Given the problem (ct+1, Et+1), since ct+1i = min {c
t
i, λ
t}, given
pit+1 ∈ P t+1 we have that∑
j∈pit+1
(ct+1j −min{c
t+1
j , λ
t}) =
∑
j∈pit+1
(min{ctj, λ
t} −min{min{ctj, λ
t}, λt}) = 0 ≤ Et+1
pit+1
.
Since λt+1 is the minimum feasible award in the problem (ct+1, Et+1), λt ≥ λt+1 and so λt = λt+1.
Hence, ∑
j∈pit+1
(
ct+1j −min
{
ct+1j , λ
t+1
})
= 0 for all pit+1 ∈ P t+1.
Since Et+1
pit+1
> 0 for all pit+1 ∈ P t+1, we can find λ < λt+1 such that
0 <
∑
j∈pit+1
(
ct+1j −min
{
ct+1j , λ
})
≤ Et+1
pit+1
for all pit+1 ∈ P t+1, which contradicts the fact that λt+1 is the minimum feasible loss in the
problem (ct+1, Et+1). Thus, λt > λt+1 for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
2. Consider i ∈ N such that i ∈ NTi but i /∈ NTi+1. Thus,
ECELi(c, E) =
Ti∑
t=1
(
cti −min
{
cti, λ
t
})
.
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We know that cti = min
{
ct−1i , λ
t−1
}
. Following on with this argument we obtain that
cti = min
{
ct−2i , λ
t−2, λt−1
}
= . . . = min
{
ci, min
k=1,...,t−1
{
λk
}}
.
By Proposition 1.1, cti = min
{
ci, λ
t−1
}
, where we consider λ0 = ci by the sake of convenience.
Given this new definition of cti, the extended constrained equal loss rule can be rewritten as
ECELi(c, E) =
Ti∑
t=1
(
min
{
ci, λ
t−1
}
−min
{
ci, λ
t
})
= min
{
ci, λ
0
}
−min
{
ci, λ
Ti
}
= ci −min
{
ci, λ
Ti
}
.
3. Consider the problem (ct, Et). By definition of CEL, there always exists pit0 ∈ P
t such that∑
i∈pit
0
CELi(c
t, Et) = Et
pit
0
. Thus, pit0 ∩N
t+1 = ∅.
4. Given i ∈ N with ECELi(c, E) < ci, assume that for every pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi, pi ∩NTi 6= ∅
and pi ∩NTi+1 = ∅ it is verified that
∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) < Epi. Consider
ε = min
i∈pi∈P :pi∩NTi 6=∅,
pi∩NTi+1=∅
{
Epi −
∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E), ci − ECELi(c, E)
}
> 0.
Due to the definition of ε we have that
(
CELi
(
cTi , ETi
)
+ ε, CEL−i(c
Ti , ETi)
)
∈ F (cTi , ETi),
which is a contradiction.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Of course ECEL satisfies WPO and PO because of its definition. It also satisfies LCD because when
P = {N}, ECEL(c, E) = CEL(c, E) and the constrained equal loss rule satisfies composition down
in bankruptcy problems. Moreover, since CEL satisfy ETE in bankruptcy problems, it can be easily
proved that ECEL satisfies ETE in PCC.
• ECEL satisfies LS. Given an agent i ∈ N , we must prove that
ECELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λ
Ti} ≥ min
i∈α∈P
ECELi(cα, Eα) = ci −min
{
ci, max
i∈α∈P
λα
}
.
By Proposition 1.2, ECELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λTi}. If λTi = 0, LS holds trivially. If λTi > 0,
ECELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λTi} < ci. By Proposition 1.3, there exists pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi,
pi ∩NTi 6= ∅, pi ∩NTi+1 = ∅ and∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi
(cj −min{cj, λ
Tj}) = Epi .
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It is enough to prove that ECELi(c, E) ≥ CELi(cpi, Epi) = ECELi(cpi, Epi).
Since λTi > 0, cpi /∈ F (cpi , Epi). Thus, CELj(cpi , Epi) = cj −min{cj, λpi} for all j ∈ pi and∑
j∈pi
(cj −min{cj, λpi}) = Epi . (1)
pi∩NTi+1 = ∅, thus Tj ≤ Ti for all j ∈ pi. By Proposition 1.1, λ
Tj ≥ λTi for all j ∈ pi (2). By (1)
and (2), λpi ≥ λTi . Hence, ECELi(c, E) = ci−min{ci, λTi} ≥ ci−min{ci, λpi} = CELi(cpi , Epi).
• ECEL satisfies CONS : Given (c, E) and M ⊂ N , we have to prove that
ECELi(N,P, c, E) = ECELi(M,PM , cM , E
∗
M ) for every i ∈M
where E∗pi∩M = Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECELj(c, E) for every pi ∩M ∈ PM .
When c ∈ F (c, E) CONS is trivially satisfied. Therefore, we restrict the proof to the case when
c /∈ F (c, E). We assume E∗pi∩M > 0 for all pi ∩M ∈ PM . It can be easily proved that when there
is any E∗pi∩M = 0 the property also holds.
First we introduce some notation.
– Given i ∈M , let us define TMi in the usual way, i ∈M
TMi , but i /∈MT
M
i +1.
– {T rM}
s
r=1. Consider T
0
M = 0. Assume we have defined T
l
M for all l ≤ r − 1 and T
r−1
M <
max
i∈M
{TMi }. Then, T
r
M = min{Ti : i ∈M,Ti > T
r−1
M } and T
s
M = max
i∈M
{TMi }.
We prove that given i ∈M with Ti = T rM , then T
M
i = r and
ECELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ci −min{ci, λ
r
M} = ci −min{ci, λ
T rM } = ECELi(c, E).
Consider CELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ci −min
{
ci, λ
1
M
}
.
Claim 1 λ1M = λ
T 1M .
Proof. If λT
1
M = 0, by Remark 2 we know that cT
1
M ∈ F (cT
1
M , ET
1
M ) and ECELi(c, E) = ci for
all i ∈ NT
1
M . Besides, since Ti ≥ T
1
M for all i ∈ M , M ⊂ N
T 1M . Thus, it can be proved that
cM ∈ F (cM , E∗M ) and ECELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ci = ECELi(c, E) for all i ∈M .
Assume λT
1
M > 0. First we prove that λT
1
M is a feasible loss in the problem (cM , E
∗
M ), i.e.∑
j∈pi∩M
(cj −min{cj, λ
T 1M }) ≤ E∗pi∩M for all pi ∩M ∈ PM .
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Given pi ∩M ∈ PM , Tj ≥ T 1M for all j ∈ M . By Proposition 1.1, λ
Tj ≤ λT
1
M for all j ∈ M .
Hence,
∑
j∈pi∩M
(cj −min{cj , λ
T 1M }) ≤
∑
j∈pi∩M
(cj −min{cj, λ
Tj}) =
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECELj(c, E)
≤ Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECELj(c, E) = E
∗
pi∩M .
Since λ1M is the minimum feasible loss in the problem (cM , E
∗
M ), λ
1
M ≤ λ
T 1M .
Consider i ∈ M with Ti = T
1
M . As λ
T 1M > 0, ECELi(c, E) = ci − min{ci, λ
T 1M } < ci.
By Proposition 1.4, there exists pi ∈ P where i ∈ pi, pi ∩ NT
1
M 6= ∅, pi ∩ NT
1
M+1 = ∅, and∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) = Epi. Thus,
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECELj(c, E) = Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECELj(c, E) = E
∗
pi∩M .
Given j ∈ pi ∩M , Tj = T 1M and therefore, ECELj(c, E) = cj −min{cj, λ
T 1M }. Hence∑
j∈pi∩M
ECELj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi∩M
(
cj −min
{
cj , λ
T 1M
})
= E∗pi∩M
while
∑
j∈pi∩M
(
cj −min
{
cj , λ
1
M
})
≤ E∗pi∩M . Therefore, λ
1
M ≥ λ
T 1M and so λ1M = λ
T 1M .
Claim 2 Given i ∈M such that Ti = T 1M . Then, T
M
i = 1 and ECELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ECELi(c, E).
Proof. Given i ∈M such that Ti = T 1M , by Claim 1 we have that
ECELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λ
T 1M } = ci −min{ci, λ
1
M} = CELi(cM , E
∗
M ).
If λ1M = 0, then CELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ci = ECEL(cM , E
∗
M ) = ECEL(c, E).
Consider λ1M > 0. Then, ECELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λ
1
M} < ci. By Proposition 1.4 there exists
pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi, pi ∩NT
1
M 6= ∅, pi ∩NT
1
M+1 = ∅, and
∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECELj(c, E) +
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECELj(c, E)
=
∑
j∈pi∩M
(cj −min{cj, λ
1
M}) +
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECELj(c, E)
=
∑
j∈pi∩M
CELj(cM , E
∗
M ) +
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECELj(c, E) = Epi.
Thus, ∑
j∈pi∩M
CELj(cM , E
∗
M ) = Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECELj(c, E) = E
∗
pi∩M .
Hence TMi = 1 and CELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ECELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ECELi(c, E).
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Assume that given i ∈M with Ti = T rM , we have that T
M
i = r and
ECELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ci −min{ci, λ
r
M} = ci −min{ci, λ
T rM } = ECELi(c, E).
for all r ≤ l.
Consider r = l + 1 and the problem (M l+1, P l+1M , c
l+1
M , (E
∗
M )
l+1) where:
– M l+1 =M ∩NT
l+1
M .
– P l+1M = (PM )Ml+1 .
– cl+1i = min{ci, λ
T lM } = min{ci, λlM} for all i ∈M
l+1 by induction hypothesis.
– El+1
pi∩Ml+1
= E∗pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩(M\Ml+1)
ECELi(cM , E
∗
M )−
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(ci −min{ci, λT
l
M })
= E∗pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩(M\Ml+1)
ECELi(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(ci −min{ci, λ
l
M})
= Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELi(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(ci −min{ci, λlM})
by induction hypothesis.
Consider CELi(c
l+1
M , (E
∗
M )
l+1) = cl+1i −min{c
l+1
i , λ
l+1
M }.
Claim 3 λl+1M = λ
T
l+1
M .
Proof. If λT
l+1
M = 0, by Remark 2, cT
l+1
M ∈ F (cT
l+1
M , ET
l+1
M ) and ECELi(c, E) = ci for all
i ∈ NT
l+1
M . It is easy to prove that in this case cl+1M ∈ F (c
l+1
M , E
l+1
M ) and therefore λ
l+1
M = 0.
Thus, we assume λT
l+1
M > 0.
First we prove that λT
l+1
M is a feasible loss i.e.∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
cl+1j −min{c
l+1
j , λ
T
l+1
M }
)
≤ El+1
pi∩Ml+1
for all pi ∩M l+1 ∈ P l+1M .
We can rewrite this expression taking into account the definitions above∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
min{cj, λ
l
M} −min{min{cj, λ
l
M}, λ
T
l+1
M }
)
≤ Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELi(c, E)
−
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(ci −min{ci, λ
l
M}).
By the induction hypothesis, λlM = λ
T lM and by Proposition 1.1, λT
l
M > λT
l+1
M . Therefore,∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
min{cj , λ
l
M} −min{cj, λ
T
l+1
M }
)
≤ Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELi(c, E)
−
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(ci −min{ci, λ
l
M}).
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Thus,∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
min{cj, λ
l
M} −min{cj, λ
T
l+1
M }
)
+
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
cj −min{cj, λ
l
M}
)
=
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
cj −min{cj , λ
T
l+1
M }
)
≤ Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELj(c, E) = E
∗
pi∩Ml+1 .
So proving the feasibility of λT
l+1
M is equivalent to prove that∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
cj −min{cj , λ
T
l+1
M }
)
≤ E∗pi∩Ml+1 for all pi ∩M
l+1 ∈ P l+1M .
Given j ∈ pi ∩M l+1, due to the definition of T l+1M , Tj ≥ T
l+1
M . By Proposition 1.1, λ
Tj ≤ λT
l+1
M .
Therefore,∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
cj −min{cj , λ
T
l+1
M }
)
≤
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
cj −min{cj, λ
Tj}
)
=
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
ECELj(c, E)
≤ Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELj(c, E) = E
∗
pi∩Ml+1 .
Since λl+1M is the minimum feasible loss in the problem (c
l+1
M , (E
∗
M )
l+1), we have that λl+1M ≤ λ
T
l+1
M .
Consider an agent i ∈M l+1 such that Ti = T
l+1
M , then ECELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λ
T
l+1
M } < ci.
By Proposition 1.4, there exists pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi, pi ∩ NT
l+1
M 6= ∅, pi ∩ NT
l+1
M
+1 = ∅ and∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) = Epi. In particular,
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
ECELj(c, E) = E
∗
pi∩Ml+1 .
Given j ∈ pi ∩M l+1, Tj = T
l+1
M and∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
ECELj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
cj −min{cj , λ
T
l+1
M }
)
= E∗pi∩Ml+1 .
Since
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(
cj−min{cj, λ
l+1
M }
)
≤ E∗
pi∩Ml+1 , we have that λ
T
l+1
M ≤ λl+1M . Hence λ
l+1
M = λ
T
l+1
M .
Claim 4 Given i ∈ M such that Ti = T
l+1
M . Then, T
M
i = l + 1 and ECELi(cM , E
∗
M ) =
ECELi(c, E).
Proof. Given i ∈M such that Ti = T
l+1
M , by Claim 3 we have that
ECELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λ
T
l+1
M } = ci −min{ci, λ
l+1
M } =
l+1∑
t=1
CELi(c
t
M , (E
∗
M )
t).
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If λl+1M = 0, we have that
l+1∑
t=1
CELi(c
t
M , (E
∗
M )
t) = ECELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ci = ECEL(c, E).
Consider λl+1M > 0. Then, ECELi(c, E) = ci − min{ci, λ
l+1
M } < ci. By Proposition 1.4 there
exists pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi, pi ∩NT
l+1
M 6= ∅ but pi ∩NT
l+1
M
+1 = ∅ and
∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
ECELj(c, E) +
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELj(c, E)
=
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(cj −min{cj, λ
l+1
M }) +
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELj(cM , E
∗
M )
=
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
l+1∑
t=1
(ctj −min{c
t
j , λ
t
M}) +
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELj(cM , E
∗
M ) = Epi.
Thus,
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
(cl+1j −min{c
l+1
j , λ
l+1
M }) =
= Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\Ml+1)
ECELj(cM , EM )−
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
l∑
t=1
(ctj −min{c
t
j, λ
t
M})
= E∗pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩(M\Ml+1)
ECELj(cM , EM )−
∑
j∈pi∩Ml+1
l∑
t=1
(ctj −min{c
t
j, λ
t
M})
= El+1
pi∩Ml+1
.
Hence TMi = l + 1 and ECELi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ECELi(c, E).
• ECEL satisfies MRF. Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), we have to prove that
ECEL(c, E) = m(c, E) + ECEL(c′, E′)
where mi(c, E) = max
{
0, min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j 6=i
cj
}}
is the minimal right for agent i, c′i =
ci −mi(c, E) for all i ∈ N , and E′pi = Epi −
∑
j∈pi
mj(c, E) for all pi ∈ P .
Claim 5 ECELi(c, E) = mi(c, E) + c
′
i −min{c
′
i, λ
Ti} for all i ∈ N .
Proof. First we prove that ECELi(c, E) ≥ mi(c, E) for all i ∈ N . Consider i ∈ N :
– If ECELi(c, E) = ci or mi(c, E) = 0, we have that ECELi(c, E) ≥ mi(c, E).
– If mi(c, E) = ci, cpi ∈ F (cpi, Epi) for all pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi. Thus, ECELi(c, E) = ci =
mi(c, E) because ECEL satisfies PO.
– Consider ECELi(c, E) < ci and 0 < mi(c, E) < ci. mi(c, E) > 0 implies that mi(c, E) =
min
i∈pi∈P
{
Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j 6=i
cj
}
. Besides, since ECELi(c, E) < ci, by Proposition 1.4, there exists
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pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi, pi ∩NTi 6= ∅, pi ∩NTi+1 = ∅, and
∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) = Epi.
ECELi(c, E) = Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j 6=i
ECELj ≥ Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j 6=i
cj
≥ min
i∈α∈P
{
Eα −
∑
j∈α:j 6=i
cj
}
= mi(c, E).
Thus, ECELi(c, E) = ci−min{ci, λTi} ≥ mi(c, E). Hence, min{ci, λTi} ≤ ci−mi(c, E) = c′i ≤ ci
and it can be easily proved that min{ci, λTi} = min{c′i, λ
Ti}. Therefore
ECELi(c, E) = ci −min{ci, λ
Ti} = mi(c, E) + c
′
i −min{c
′
i, λ
Ti}.
Claim 6 ECELi(c
′, E′) = c′i −min{c
′
i, λ
Ti} for all i ∈ N .
Proof. We prove this result by induction.
Consider i ∈ N such that Ti = 1. If λ1 = 0, by Remark 2., c ∈ F (c, E). It is easy to prove that
in this case mi(c, E) = ci for all i ∈ N . Thus, c′i = 0 for all i ∈ N and ECELi(c
′, E′) = 0 =
c′i −min{c
′
i, λ
Ti}.
Let us assume λ1 > 0.
Given the problem (c′, E′), consider CELi(c
′, E′) = c′i − min{c
′
i, λ
′}. We prove that λ′ = λ1.
Consider α ∈ P , Tj ≥ 1 for all j ∈ α. By Proposition 1.1, λTj ≤ λ1. Thus,∑
j∈α
(c′j −min{c
′
j, λ
1}) =
∑
j∈α
(cj −min{c
′
j , λ
1})−
∑
j∈α
mj(c, E)
≤
∑
j∈α
(cj −min{c
′
j , λ
Tj})−
∑
j∈α
mj(c, E)
=
∑
j∈α
(cj −min{cj , λ
Tj})−
∑
j∈α
mj(c, E)
≤ Eα −
∑
j∈α
mj(c, E) = E
′
α.
Since λ′ is the minimum feasible loss in the problem (c′, E′), λ′ ≤ λ1.
ECELi(c, E) = ci − {ci, λ1} < ci. By Proposition 1.4, there exists pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi,
pi ∩N1 6= ∅, pi ∩N2 = ∅, and
∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi
(cj −min{cj, λ
1}) = Epi. Thus,
∑
j∈pi
(c′j −min{c
′
j, λ
1}) =
∑
j∈pi
(cj −mj(c, E)−min{cj , λ
1}) = Epi −
∑
j∈pi
mj(c, E) = E
′
pi
while
∑
j∈pi
(c′j −min{c
′
j, λ
′}) ≤ E′pi. Hence λ
1 ≤ λ′ and so λ1 = λ′.
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Thus, given i ∈ N such that Ti = 1, ECELi(c′, E′) = c′i −min{c
′
i, λ
1}.
Assume ECELi(c
′, E′) = c′i −min{c
′
i, λ
Ti} for all i ∈ N such that Ti ≤ r.
Consider i ∈ N such that Ti = r+1. Given M = N
r+1, we define the problem (M,PM , cM , EM )
in the usual way. Since ECEL satisfies CONS, we have that ECELi(c
′, E′) = ECELi(c
′
M , E
′
M )
where E′pi∩M = E
′
pi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECELj(c
′, E′) for every pi ∩M ∈ PM .
By the induction hypothesis, ECELj(c
′, E′) = c′j −min{c
′
j, λ
Tj} for all j ∈ N \M . Therefore,
E′pi∩M = E
′
pi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
(c′j −min{c
′
j, λ
Tj})
= Epi −
∑
j∈pi
mj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
(c′j −min{cj, λ
Tj})
= Epi −
∑
j∈pi
mj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
(cj −mj(c, E)−min{cj , λ
Tj})
= Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
(cj −min{cj, λ
Tj})−
∑
j∈pi∩M
mj(c, E) = E
∗
pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩M
mj(c, E).
Consider CEL(c′M , E
′
M ) = c
′
i −min {c
′
i, λ
′
M}. Let us prove that λ
′
M = λ
r+1. Since Tj ≥ r + 1
for all j ∈ M , by Proposition 1.1, λTj ≤ λr+1. First we prove that λr+1 is a feasible loss in the
problem (c′M , E
′
M )∑
j∈pi∩M
(c′j −min{c
′
j, λ
r+1}) ≤
∑
j∈pi∩M
(c′j −min{c
′
j, λ
Tj})
=
∑
j∈pi∩M
(cj −mj(c, E)−min{cj, λ
Tj})
=
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECELj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩M
mj(c, E)
≤ E∗pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩M
mj(c, E) = E
′
pi∩M .
Thus, λr+1 ≥ λ′M .
To avoid trivial situations we assume λr+1 > 0. Therefore, ECELi(c, E) = ci−min{ci, λr+1} <
ci. By Proposition 1.4, there exists pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi, pi ∩ N
r+1 6= ∅, pi ∩ N r+2 = ∅
and
∑
j∈pi
ECELj(c, E) = Epi, which implies that
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECELj(c, E) = E
∗
pi∩M . Moreover, since
M = N r+1 and pi ∩N r+2 = ∅, we have that∑
j∈pi∩M
ECELj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi∩M
(cj −min{cj, λ
r+1}) =
∑
j∈pi∩M
(cj −min{c
′
j, λ
r+1}) = E∗pi∩M .
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Therefore, ∑
j∈pi∩M
(c′j −min{c
′
j, λ
r+1}) = E∗pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩M
mj(c, E) = E
′
pi∩M .
Hence, λr+1 ≤ λ′M , λ
r+1 = λ′M , and given i ∈ N such that Ti = r + 1 we have that
ECELi(c
′
M , E
′
M ) = c
′
i −min{c
′
i, λ
′
M} = c
′
i −min{ci, λ
r+1}.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
By Proposition 2, we know that ECEL satisfies PO, LS, ETE, MRF, CONS and LCD. Given a PCC
(N, c, P,E), to prove the uniqueness, suppose there exists an allocation rule R satisfying PO, LS, ETE,
MRF, CONS and LCD.
We assume c /∈ F (c, E). Otherwise, R(c, E) = c = ECEL(c, E) because both rules satisfy PO.
We prove the uniqueness by induction in |P |.
• When |P | = 1, we have that ECEL(c, E) = CEL(c, E).
Herrero (2003) proves that the constrained equal loss rule is the only efficient rule satisfying
MRF, CD and ETE in bankruptcy problems. As R satisfies PO, MRF, LCD and ETE we have
that R(c, E) = CEL(c, E) = ECEL(c, E).
• Assume R(c, E) = ECEL(c, E) when |P | ≤ k − 1.
• Consider |P | = k. By LS, Ri(c, E) ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
Ri(cpi, Epi) = min
i∈pi∈P
CELi(cpi, Epi) as |Ppi | = 1. Thus,
Ri(c, E) ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
{ci −min{ci, λpi}} = ci −min
{
ci, max
i∈pi∈P
λpi
}
.
CELi(c, E) = ci −min
{
ci, λ
1
}
where λ1 = max
pi∈P
{λpi}, hence R(c, E) ≥ CEL(c, E).
We assume T > 1. Otherwise, ECEL(c, E) = CEL(c, E) and by PO we can conclude that
R(c, E) = ECEL(c, E). By Proposition 1.3, |P t+1| < |P t| for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1. In
particular |P 2| < |P 1|. Thus, there exists pi0 ∈ P such that∑
i∈pi0
CELi(c, E) =
∑
i∈pi0
(
ci −min
{
ci, λ
1
})
= Epi0 .
Therefore, pi0 ⊂ N1 \ N2 and CELi(c, E) = ECELi(c, E) for every i ∈ pi0. We know that
R(c, E) ≥ CEL(c, E). Therefore, since both rules satisfy PO, Ri(c, E) = CELi(c, E) =
ECELi(c, E) for all i ∈ pi0.
Given M = N \ {pi0}, we define (M,PM , cM , E∗M ) in the usual way. Since |PM | = k − 1 by
induction hypothesis and taking into account that both rules satisfy CONS we have that
Ri(c, E) = Ri(cM , EM ) = ECELi(cM , EM ) = ECELi(c, E)
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for every i ∈M . Thus, R(c, E) = ECEL(c, E).
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